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Media ￿rms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an
advertisement-based product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolist￿ s incentives
to introduce this option. When deciding whether to introduce the option to pay, the
monopolist compares the potential direct revenues from consumers with lost advertising
revenues from not intermediating those consumers to advertisers. If the option is intro-
duced, the media ￿rm increases advertising quantity to make the option to pay more
attractive. This hurts consumers, but bene￿ts the media ￿rm and advertisers. Total
welfare may increase or decrease. Perhaps surprisingly, more annoying advertisements
may lead to an increase in advertising quantity.
Keywords: Advertising, damaged goods, media markets, price discrimination, two-
sided markets, vertical di⁄erentiation.
JEL-codes: D42, L15, L59, M37
1 Introduction
There are many recent examples of cases where ￿rms allow consumers to pay to remove ad-
vertisements from an otherwise advertising-based product. For example, Slashdot.org allows
users to pay $5 for 1000 ad-free pages.1 Gamespot.com o⁄ers a monthly subscription at
$3.33 that gives the subscriber access to "The GameSpot experience without intrusive ads or
commercials".2 The Walt Disney Company (and many others) o⁄ers TV series for purchase
through the iTunes store at $1.99 per episode. A free alternative with advertisements is
available on their homepage or by watching the show on TV.3 We7 o⁄ers music downloads
￿This research was partly conducted while the author was holding a GS Fellowship position awarded by
the Finnish Doctoral Programme in Economics, partly while being a visiting scholar at Leonard N. Stern
School of Business, New York University (supported by an ALSA-Fulbright grant and the Commerce and
Industry Fund at Hanken) and partly within the Gustaf Douglas Research Program on Entrepreneurship at
the Research Institute of Industrial Economics. I would like to thank Jay Pil Choi, Tore Nilssen, Lars Słrgard,
Rune Stenbacka, Tuomas Takalo, Otto Toivanen, David Waterman, two anonymous referees, and numerous
colleagues and workshop participants for very helpful discussions, comments and suggestions.
1http://slashdot.org/faq/subscriptions.shtml (accessed December 2008).
2http://www.gamespot.com (accessed December 2008).
3See http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (accessed December 2008). Some cable television companies also o⁄er
subscription services for digital video recorders that can be set to automatically remove advertisements from
recorded shows.
1with ads attached to the beginning of the song for free or at a fee without the ads.4 There
are also companies such as Ultramercial that allow consumers to "pay" for premium content
on websites by watching a series of interactive advertisements.5
These examples highlight a strategy where media providers practice second-degree price
discrimination by o⁄ering two versions di⁄ering in advertising quantity. The strategy is easily
followed for online media ￿rms, since advertisements are easily separable from content. In
general, there has been a shift in the distribution costs of content, implying that media ￿rms
now ￿nd it easier to distribute multiple versions of their content, which is in stark contrast
to traditional print and broadcasting media where the distribution costs can be high. For
example, technologies such as streaming video over the Internet and enhanced compression
techniques make it easy to charge consumers for an ad-free version of television shows.
But what are the incentives of media ￿rms to introduce the option to pay to remove
advertisements? And what are the welfare implications? In this paper, we aim at answering
these questions. They are important, as the provision of programming and advertising in
the broadcasting industry has been subjected to a considerable degree of attention from
regulators. For example, advertising quantity is regulated in several European countries. As
an increasing amount of advertising expenditures moves online, the implications of newly
available strategies, such as charging consumers for the removal of advertisements, may
become important in policy discussions.
We set up a stylized model of a monopolist media ￿rm entirely ￿nanced by advertise-
ments. Consumers are assumed to dislike advertisements, and we model bundling advertise-
ments with a good as reducing the perceived quality of the good ("damaging" the good).
Then, we study the incentives of the ￿rm to introduce an ad-free version at a positive
price. Advertising quantity, and hence the quality of the free advertising-based version, is
endogenous. We show that the monopolist will introduce the option if the disutility from
advertisements experienced by consumers is su¢ ciently high in relation to advertisers￿pro￿t
margins from reaching users. We highlight three results.
First, if the option to pay is introduced, there is an increase in advertising quantity.
The media ￿rm compares the revenue from paying consumers with the potential advertising
revenue that can be earned by mediating those consumers to advertisers. Because the free
advertising-based product cannibalizes on the sales of a pay version without advertisements,
the media ￿rm optimally increases advertising quantity in the free version when the option to
pay to remove advertisements is introduced. This result gives the empirical implication that
observed advertising quantity should be higher if the option to pay to remove advertisements
is available.
Second, advertising quantity in the free version may be increasing in the disutility caused
by advertisements. The reason is that increasing advertising quantity is a more e⁄ective
way of reducing the perceived quality of the free version when consumers￿disutility from
advertisements is high. Hence, an empirical implication is that advertisements should be
more annoying and intrusive if the option to pay to remove advertisements is present.
4See http://www.we7.com (accessed December 2008).
5See http://www.ultramercial.com (accessed December 2008).
2Third, regarding the welfare e⁄ects of introducing the option to pay, we show that con-
sumers￿welfare decreases, while media ￿rm pro￿ts and advertiser pro￿ts increase. Consumer
welfare decreases because consumers using the free version see more advertisements, and con-
sumers paying to remove advertisements pay a price that causes more disutility than what
advertisements would have caused had the option to pay not been available.
Our paper is related to the literature on price discrimination in media markets, to the
literature on quality segmentation and damaged goods and to the recent literature on two-
sided markets.
We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in media markets by analyzing
the case of second-degree price discrimination by introducing the option to pay to remove
advertisements from an otherwise ad-based free product. Previous analyses in the media
market literature have focused on welfare issues related to pay-per-view versus free airing
of outstanding events (such as boxing matches). Price discrimination is an issue since the
media ￿rm can require consumers to pay to watch the event live and then air it for free a
day later. This is the setup in Holden (1993) which concludes that consumers are harmed by
the possibility of pay-per-view. Hansen and Kyhl (2001) consider a slightly di⁄erent setup
where the pay-per-view version contains advertisements and a free version is not available.
They analyze how a ban on pay-per-view a⁄ects welfare. They ￿nd that consumer welfare is
enhanced by a ban, but the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous. A recent addition to the
literature is Anderson and Gans (2008), who examine the impact on broadcaster behavior
when consumers adopt advertising avoidance technologies.6 They show that advertising
quantity could increase, as the remaining consumers are less averse to advertising. As a
result, overall welfare and program quality could decrease and programming would be tailored
to appeal to a broader range of viewers. Price discrimination in media markets has also
attracted some attention in the marketing literature. Prasad, Mahajan, and Bronnenberg
(2003) analyze the incentives to price discriminate when consumers are of two given types
and a media ￿rm may o⁄er two versions di⁄ering in advertising quantity and price. They
show that o⁄ering two versions (price discrimination) tends to be optimal in most cases.
We also contribute to the literature on intertemporal and product quality segmentation,
mainly in relation to the literature on damaged goods.7 Deneckere and McAfee (1996)
examine costly reduction of quality ("damaging" an already developed product) in order to
obtain a lower quality version. Chiang and Spatt (1982) study quality reduction by bundling
wait time and Salop (1977) study quality reduction by bundling search costs with the product.
In our setup, quality is reduced by bundling advertisements with the product. Compared
to degrading quality by other means, "damaging" goods with advertisements is di⁄erent
since it generates a new source of revenues. This gives the ￿rm an additional incentive to
"damage" its goods. Our paper also relates to the vertical product di⁄erentiation literature
(e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Greenstein and Ramey (1998)) in that we study the
incentives to bring out a higher quality product at a fee in addition to a free, but lower
quality, advertising-based product.
6See also Wilbur (2008a,b) for empirical results relating to the use of advertising avoidance technologies.
7For a good treatment of damaged goods and versioning, see Varian (2001).
3Finally, we also contribute to the literature on two-sided media markets,8 and to the
two-sided market literature in general,9 by studying second-degree price discrimination in a
two-sided market setting. A crucial di⁄erence between second-degree price discrimination in
one-sided markets as compared to the current setup using a two-sided market approach is that
the price and the quality of the lower quality version depend on the price for advertising space
set on the other side of the market. In a one-sided market, prices are set given the quality
of the di⁄erent versions. Here, as prices for the versions change, so does the attractiveness
of advertising space to advertisers. This, in turn, a⁄ects the optimal price for advertising
space and the amount of advertising determining the quality of the lower quality version.
We have structured the paper in the following way. In section 2, we ￿rst set up a
model of a monopolist media ￿rm o⁄ering an advertising-supported product (subsection
2.2) and then examine the incentives of the monopolist to introduce a pay version of the
product without advertisements (subsection 2.3). Then, we study the welfare implications of
allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements (subsection 2.4) and discuss the model
and possible extensions (section 3). The ￿nal section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a monopolist media ￿rm that has developed a good of the intrinsic quality level qp =
v > 0. The media ￿rm can be a broadcaster, a magazine, a software ￿rm, a website or any
other kind of ￿rm that can embed advertisements in its product. The ￿xed costs related to the
development of this product are sunk and duplication carries small or zero costs. Initially,
the media ￿rm is advertising-based and does not charge consumers. However, consumers
dislike advertisements. The perceived quality of the product accounting for disutility from
advertisements is qa = v ￿ ￿a > 0, where a 2 [0;1] is advertising quantity and ￿ < v is
a measure of how annoying advertisements are perceived to be.10 Consumers, a continuum
of mass N with unit demand, are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal valuation of
quality denoted by ￿. The distribution of ￿ is uniform on the unit interval. Hence, consumer
i values the advertising-based media ￿rm￿ s product at ui = ￿iqa = ￿i(v ￿ ￿a).
The speci￿c dependence of quality on advertising used here allows consumers to be het-
erogeneous both in terms of intrinsic product quality and the impact of advertising on their
utility.11 This is consistent with an interpretation that advertisements degrade the perceived
8E.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Crampes, Haritchablet and Jullien (2005) and Gabzewicz, Laussel and
Sonnac (2004).
9E.g. Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006).
10That consumers dislike advertising is in line with Holden (1993), Hansen and Kyhl (2001), Prasad,
Mahajan and Bronnenberg (2003) and Anderson and Gans (2008). For the markets we consider, this seems
to be a reasonable assumption since consumers are observed to be willing to pay to remove advertisements
and thus, they clearly reveal a preference for consuming the product without ads.
11A heterogeneous impact of advertising on utility is an important di⁄erence between our model and the
analyses in Holden (1993) and Hansen and Kyhl (2001). Heterogeneous aversion to advertising is part of the
analysis in Prasad, Mahajan and Bronnenberg (2003), but they do not consider to what extent advertisements
have an impact on utility. Essentially, the assumption is that ￿ = 1. Moreover, they only consider two
consumer types (￿H and ￿L).
4quality of the product (they "damage" the product). It seems reasonable to assume that
consumers who value quality more also dislike advertisements more. First, in many cases,
advertising takes up space, which reduces the amount of content. The reduction of content is
more important for consumers who value content highly. Second, advertising requires atten-
tion from consumers. Consumers who value quality highly might have a higher opportunity
cost of time and hence, dislike advertisements more. Note, though, that this assumption also
implies that all consumers will use the media ￿rm￿ s product since qa > 0 and the product is
free. We retain this assumption as it simpli￿es our analysis, although note that it is not a
standard assumption in the literature.
Advertising quantity, a, hence also qa, is endogenous in the model. Advertisers, a con-
tinuum with mass 1, are monopoly producers of new goods.12 Advertising ￿lls the role of
informing consumers about the prices and characteristics of their goods.13 Each advertiser
has developed a new good characterized by its type ￿ uniformly distributed on the unit in-
terval. The type of good indicates its purchase probability after being advertised. Goods of
a higher type are more likely to be bought after being advertised. The pro￿t margin on the
goods sold by the advertisers is s. Advertiser j is willing to pay a maximum price of ￿jsnN
to place an advertisement in the media ￿rm￿ s product, where n is the fraction of consumers
viewing the advertisements attached to the media ￿rm￿ s product. Advertiser j pro￿ts from
advertising according to ￿jsnN￿pa if advertising and 0 otherwise. Here, pa denotes the price
charged by the media ￿rm for advertising space. The advertiser who is indi⁄erent between
advertising and not has ￿a =
pa
snN, thus implying that the mass of advertising advertisers,
hence advertising quantity, is a = 1 ￿
pa
snN.
2.2 An Advertising-based Media Firm
A media ￿rm that is entirely advertising-based faces the decision of optimally setting the
price for advertising space. Since n = 1, demand for advertising space is a(pa) = (1 ￿
pa
sN)
for pa 2 [0;Ns], a(pa) = 0 for pa > Ns and a(pa) = 1 otherwise. The media ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
function is given by
￿A(pa) = paa(pa): (1)
The ￿rm chooses the price for ad-space so as to maximize pro￿ts.
Lemma 1 When the media ￿rm is advertising-based, the pro￿ts are ￿A = sN
4 and the
advertising quantity is aa = 1
2.
Proofs to all lemmas and propositions are found in the Appendix. When the ￿rm is
advertising-based, all consumers use the product and view advertisements. The media ￿rm
can charge more for ad-space if advertisers￿pro￿t margins (s) are higher or if there are
more consumers (N) in the market viewing the advertisements. How annoying consumers
perceive advertisements to be (￿) does not a⁄ect prices or advertising quantity since qa > 0
(the market is covered).
12So N > 1 implies that there are relatively more consumers than advertisers.
13For a discussion of the di⁄erent roles of advertising see, for example, Bagwell (2007). The advertising












Figure 1: Consumers either watch advertisements or pay to remove them. Advertisers either
advertise or not.
2.3 Introducing the Option to Pay to Remove Advertisements
Let us now examine the media ￿rm￿ s incentive to introduce the option of paying to remove
advertisements, i.e. the incentive to bring out a higher quality product not "damaged" by
advertisements but at a positive price pc.
Let ￿c denote the consumer who is indi⁄erent between paying to remove advertisements
and using the advertising-based version for free. Given prices, it must then be the case
that consumers with ￿ 2 [￿c;1] pay while consumers with ￿ 2 [0;￿c] use the free version.
The location of the indi⁄erent consumer can be obtained from the indi⁄erence equation
￿cqp ￿ pc = ￿cqa or
￿cv ￿ pc = ￿c(v ￿ ￿a): (2)
Solving for ￿c, we obtain ￿c =
pc
￿a. Demand for the advertising-based version is then given by
Nn(pc;a) = N(
pc
￿a) for pc 2 [0;￿a], by N for pc > ￿a and by 0 otherwise. Demand for the fee-
based version is Nm(pc;a) = N[1￿n(pc;a)]. All consumers acquire the media ￿rm￿ s product,
but only fraction n views the ads. Demand for ad-space is, as above, a(pa;n) = (1 ￿
pa
snN)
for pa 2 [0;snN], 0 for pa > snN and 1 otherwise. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
The timing is the following. First, the media ￿rm sets prices pc and pa. Then, consumers
and advertisers observe these prices and make their purchase and participation decisions.
This timing captures a setting where consumers and advertisers arrive in an alternated
fashion, so that neither consumers nor advertisers move ￿rst. To account for the fact that
the demand for ad-space depends on the demand for the ad-based version and vice versa,
we assume that consumers form ful￿lled expectations regarding the participation of adver-
tisers and that advertisers form ful￿lled expectations regarding the participation of users.
Hence, we simultaneously solve n =
pc
￿a and a = 1 ￿
pa





￿ and a(pc;pa) =
sNpc
sNpc+pa￿, which give the share of consumers viewing the
advertisements and demand for ad-space as functions of the price for removing advertise-
ments and the price for ad-space. Demand for the advertising-based version is Nn(pc;pa)
and demand for the fee-based version is N[m(pc;pa)] = N[1 ￿ n(pc;pa)].
14Alternative variations of the model could have consumers ￿rst committing to purchase the advertising-
based version and then advertisers deciding on participation or, alternatively, have advertisers ￿rst committing
to advertise and then consumers making their purchase decisions. Such modi￿cations of the model change the
expressions for demand since one side of the market observes participation on the other side, but the analysis
is otherwise una⁄ected.
6The media ￿rm sets the prices to maximize
￿F+A = N[m(pc;pa)]pc + a(pc;pa)pa; (3)
subject to the constraints that 0 ￿ pa ￿ sNn(pc;pa) and 0 ￿ pc ￿ ￿a(pc;pa). Solving this
problem for an interior solution gives the main proposition of the paper.
Proposition 1 The option to pay to remove advertisements is introduced if ￿ > 1
2s since
an interior solution is obtained for s
￿ 2]1
2;2[. The pro￿ts are ￿F+A = N
(s+￿)2(2￿￿s)
27s￿ and are
increasing in ￿ and s. The pro￿ts from consumers are increasing in ￿ and decreasing in s.





2. It is higher than when the ￿rm is entirely ad-based and it is increasing in
￿.
This proposition shows that the media ￿rm makes its decision to introduce the option to
pay to remove advertisements based on if the additional revenues from paying consumers are
su¢ cient to o⁄set the losses from not mediating those consumers to advertisers. The revenues
from paying consumers increase if advertisements cause more disutility (￿ increases). The
revenues from mediating those consumers to advertisers increase if advertisers￿pro￿t margins
(s) increase. Hence, it is the relation between ￿ and s that is of importance.
But the media ￿rm also controls advertising quantity through the price for advertising
space. When the option to pay to remove advertisements is introduced (a product of quality
qp = v), the media ￿rm has an incentive to induce more consumers to pay to remove ad-
vertisements. It can reduce the cannibalizing e⁄ect of the free advertising-based version (of
quality qa = v ￿ ￿a) on the pay version by reducing pa and thereby increasing a. This leads
to a reduction in qa and more consumers thus choose to pay to obtain qp. This result is sim-
ilar to the results from standard second-degree price discrimination models with endogenous
quality levels (e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978)). The lower quality version of the product gets
a quality that is distorted downwards to allow for a higher price of the high-quality version.
The incentive to distort quality downwards increases as ￿ increases since the same reduction
in pa (leading to an increase in a) has a larger e⁄ect on perceived quality and thereby on the
revenues from consumers. Hence, and perhaps surprisingly, advertising quantity is increasing
in the disutility advertising causes consumers.
Finally, the proposition provides two empirically testable predictions. First, when paying
to remove advertisements is possible, advertising quantity in the free version should be higher
than when it is not. Second, advertisements should be more annoying and intrusive if the op-
tion to pay to remove advertisements is present. There seems to be some anecdotal evidence
of this result. As mentioned by Prasad, Mahajan, and Bronnenberg (2003), Slashdot.org
increased the number of advertisements displayed in connection with introducing the option
to pay to remove advertisement. The same seems to be true for Gamespot.com. Compared
to other sites operated by CNET Networks, Gamespot.com seems to have the most annoying
and intrusive advertisements. It is one of the sites in their portfolio that allows consumers
to pay to get rid of the advertisements.
72.4 Welfare Implications
What are the welfare implications of introducing the option of paying to remove advertise-
ments? Suppose that we consider total surplus de￿ned as TS = CSF +CSA+AS+￿, where
CSF is the consumer surplus for consumers using the fee based version, CSA the consumer
surplus for consumers using the advertising-based version, AS is advertiser surplus and ￿













￿snN ￿ pad￿: (6)
By substituting optimal values of pc, ￿c, a, ￿a and n, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Introducing the option to pay to remove advertisements reduces the con-
sumer surplus for





< 0, and for


















The consumer surplus decreases for consumers using the free advertising-based version
since advertising quantity is increased when the option to pay to remove advertisements
is available. Consumers paying to remove advertisements are also worse o⁄ since the price
they pay for removing advertisements is higher than the disutility advertisements would have
caused them had this option not been available. The media ￿rm obviously bene￿ts since it
could always choose not to introduce this option. Advertisers bene￿t because the price for
advertising must decrease for advertising quantity to increase. Hence, the impact on total
welfare depends on the relative sizes of gains to the media ￿rm and advertisers, versus the
losses in consumer surplus.15
Note that one potential e⁄ect on welfare of introducing the option to pay to remove
advertisements might be missing from our setup due to market coverage. If consumers
varied in their dislike of advertisements, ￿, some consumers might not use the media ￿rm￿ s
product when the media ￿rm is ad-based only. Then, there is a potential positive e⁄ect on
the consumer surplus of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements, since some of
these consumers might use it if they could pay to remove the advertisements.
15The result that consumers are harmed and that the impact on overall welfare is ambiguous is in line with
the analyses of Holden (1993) and Hansen and Kyhl (2001).
83 Discussion and Extensions
3.1 An Entirely Fee-Based Media Firm
In the above analysis, the media ￿rm did not have the option to stop selling the free
advertisement-based version of its product. The media ￿rm might have an incentive for
this if the intrinsic quality of the product, v, is su¢ ciently large. To see this, suppose that
the media ￿rm is entirely fee-based and o⁄ers no advertising-based product. Let the con-
sumer who is indi⁄erent between buying and not buying the fee-based product be of type
￿f. Then, consumers of type ￿ 2 [￿f;1] buy the product. The location of ￿f is given by
￿fv ￿ pf = 0: (7)
Demand for the fee-based product is then Nm(pf) = N(1 ￿ ￿f) = N(1 ￿
pf
v ) for pf 2 [0;v],
Nm(pf) = 0 for pf > v and Nm(pf) = N otherwise. The media ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is
￿F(pf) = pfNm(pf): (8)
The media ￿rm chooses the price to maximize pro￿ts.
Lemma 2 When the media ￿rm is fee-based, the price for the product is v
2 and the pro￿ts
are ￿F = N v
4.
When the media ￿rm is fee-based, a higher quality product implies higher pro￿ts. An
increase in the number of consumers has the same e⁄ect.16
Using this lemma, we can now compare pro￿t levels when being entirely advertisement-
based, allowing for paying to remove advertisements and having no advertisements. Then,
we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For s
￿ 2 [0; 1
2], only a fee-based version is optimal. For s
￿ 2]1
2;2[ and v <
v￿ where v￿ is such that ￿F ￿ ￿A+F = N v￿
4 ￿ N
(￿+s)2
27￿s = 0, a fee-based version and an
advertising-based version should be made available so that consumers can pay to remove
advertisements. If s
￿ 2]1
2;2[ and v ￿ v￿, only a fee-based version is optimal. For s
￿ 2 [2;1[
and v < v￿￿, where v￿￿is such that ￿F ￿ ￿A = N v￿￿
4 ￿ N s
4 = 0, the media ￿rm should be
purely advertising-based. If s
￿ 2 [2;1[ and v ￿ v￿￿, only a fee-based version is optimal.
The intuition for the above proposition is similar to the intuition for proposition 1 with
the added possibility of not taking on any advertising. Consumers￿willingness to pay for a
fee-based version is related to how annoying advertisements are (￿). Advertisers￿willingness
to pay for ad-space is related to their pro￿ts for reaching a consumer (s). Hence, the relation
between the two variables determines on what source of revenues the media ￿rm should focus.
16As consumers are heterogeneous with respect to quality, it might be asked whether the media ￿rm would
￿nd it optimal to price discriminate by o⁄ering two versions of the product, vH and vL, such that vH > vL,
but no version with advertisements. It can be shown that this kind of price discrimination is not optimal. The
reason is that the marginal costs are zero and not a⁄ected by the quality level. Hence, there is no reduction
in marginal costs when quality is reduced. It is then optimal to only o⁄er one version (with the current utility
speci￿cation).
9However, it may be the case that simply selling the product to consumers and not involving
advertisers is optimal. This is the case if product quality (v) is su¢ ciently high. Then,
because a free advertising-based version cannibalizes on the sales of the product without
advertisements, only o⁄ering a fee-based version is optimal.
3.2 On Advertisers￿Pro￿t Margins
Another possible extension of this framework would be to consider the case where the pro￿t
margins of the advertisers are dependent on consumers￿valuation of quality, ￿. Relaxing this
assumption would have at least two implications.
First, a formal model of how advertisers price their goods would be needed. Their pricing
decision would be dependent on how many consumers use the ad-based version o⁄ered by the
media ￿rm and hence, on the price for removing advertisements.17 Second, consumers would
be left with some surplus from purchasing advertisers￿goods and hence, have to balance the
disutility from having advertisements with possible gains from being informed about a useful
product generating utility.
3.3 Market Coverage, Product Quality and Variety
An important welfare aspect with regards to media industries involves how the option of
paying to remove advertisements a⁄ects the media ￿rm￿ s dynamic incentives to invest in
increasing the ￿xed product quality v. Since we have assumed that qa > 0 and that one
version is free, all consumers always purchase one of the media ￿rm￿ s products (the mar-
ket is covered). Hence, the media ￿rm has no incentives to invest in increasing v if it is
advertising-based or introduces the option to pay to remove advertisements. Moreover, our
setup does unfortunately not allow us to consider the question about how paying to remove
advertisements a⁄ects the variety of content supplied by the media ￿rm, which is another
important issue with regards to welfare discussions in the media literature. In a related paper,
Anderson and Gans (2008) show, with respect to ad-avoidance technologies, that a media
￿rm￿ s content quality might be of lower quality and be tailored to appeal to a wider range of
consumers (less variety) if consumers can use advertising avoidance technologies. However,
in our setting, the media ￿rm pro￿ts from ad-avoiders which they do not in Anderson and
Gans (2008). Hence, it is not clear that their results transfer to our setting. Unfortunately,
extending the current model to relax the assumption of market coverage and to study these
issues has proven to be less than straightforward.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a monopolist media ￿rm￿ s incentives to introduce an op-
tion to pay to remove advertisements from an otherwise advertisement-based product. The
monopolist will introduce the option if the disutility from advertisements experienced by
consumers is su¢ ciently high in relation to advertisers￿pro￿t margins from reaching users.
17Alternatively, only the pro￿t margin could be dependent on ￿ and the pricing problem could be bypassed.
10The media ￿rm trades o⁄ revenue from paying consumers with the potential advertising
revenue that can be earned by mediating those consumers to advertisers. Because the free
advertising-based product cannibalizes on the sales of a pay version without advertisements,
it is shown that the media ￿rm optimally increases advertising quantity in the free version
when the option to pay to remove advertisements is introduced. Increasing advertising quan-
tity is a more e⁄ective way of reducing the perceived quality of the free version, if consumers￿
disutility from advertisements is higher. Hence, advertising quantity in the free version may
be increasing in the disutility caused by an advertisement.
Regarding the welfare implications of introducing the option to pay, we show that con-
sumer welfare decreases, while media ￿rm pro￿ts and advertiser pro￿ts increase. Consumer
welfare decreases because consumers using the free version see more advertisements, and con-
sumers paying to remove pay a price that causes more disutility than what advertisements
would have caused had the option to pay not been available.
These results give two empirical predictions. First, the observed advertising quantity
should be higher if the option to pay to remove advertisements is available. Second, adver-
tisements should be more annoying and intrusive if the option to pay to remove advertise-
ments is present. Empirically testing these predictions would be interesting as they seem to
be in line with casual observations.
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The ￿rst-order condition is given by 1 ￿
2pa
sN = 0 which gives pa = sN
2 . The second-order
condition is satis￿ed since ￿ 2
sN < 0. Substituting pa = sN
2 in a(pa) and ￿A(pa) gives aa = 1
2
and ￿A = Ns
4 .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume the solution to be interior so that none of the constraints are binding. Taking
the ￿rst-order conditions and solving the resulting simultaneous equation system yields two




￿ )g and f0;N
s(s+￿)
￿ g. The determinants









s2g. They should alternate in sign such that the ￿rst is non-positive and
the second is non-negative for the solution to be a maximum. Since ￿ 1
s2 < 0, the optimum
cannot be the solution characterized by f0;N
s(s+￿)
￿ g. The second solution satis￿es the









a) to obtain expressions for demand in terms of the exogenous
variables. This gives n￿ =
s+￿
3￿ and a￿ =
s+￿
3s . It is now apparent that the solution is an
interior optimum only if s
￿ 2]1
2;2[, since otherwise the prices are not consistent with demand




￿) < 0 for this
range, the candidate solution is the optimum. At the boundary where s
￿ = 2, the problem
11reduces to that where only the advertising-based version is o⁄ered (n = 1 and a = 1
2). At
the other boundary s
￿ = 1
2, all advertisers buy ad-space (a = 1) so that the lower quality













27￿s2 > 0: Pro￿ts can be split into pro￿ts from consumers and




pro￿ts from advertisers are given by ￿A
A+F = N
(2s￿￿)(￿+s)2




















27￿s2 > 0. For s
￿ 2]1
2;2[, advertising quantity is a =
s+￿
3s . This is larger
than 1
2, which is the advertising quantity when the media ￿rm is entirely advertising-based
(by lemma 1).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The consumer and advertiser surplus if the media ￿rm allows consumers to pay to remove






￿(v ￿ a￿)d￿ = N























3￿ , ￿￿ =
2s￿￿







a = N 1
9(s+ 2s
￿ ￿￿). The surplus for
these consumers under the ad-based business model, i.e. with ￿￿
c =
s+￿
3￿ , ￿￿ =
2s￿￿
3s , a￿ = 1
2
and p￿
a = N s






￿(v ￿ a￿)d￿ = N







￿(v ￿ a￿)d￿ = N
(2￿ ￿ s)(4￿ + s)(2v ￿ ￿)
36￿2 ; (13)
where the sum of these two is N
(2v￿￿)
4 and the total advertiser surplus under the ad-based
business model is ASA = N s
8. Consider the following di⁄erences in surplus. Let ￿CSF =
CSF
F+A ￿ CSF
A0 denote the di⁄erence in surplus for consumers who choose to pay to remove
advertisements when this option is available to them. Let ￿CSA = CSA
F+A ￿ CSA
A0 be the
di⁄erence in surplus for consumers who still choose to use the advertising based version when
the option to pay to remove advertisements is available. Denote the di⁄erence in advertiser
surplus by ￿AS = ASF+A ￿ ASA and the di⁄erence in ￿rm pro￿ts by ￿￿ = ￿F+A ￿ ￿A.
12Let r be the ratio s














(r ￿ 2)2(1 + 4r)N￿
108r
: (17)
The di⁄erence in advertiser surplus and ￿rm pro￿ts is positive for r 2]1
2;2[. The di⁄erence
in consumer surplus is negative for both consumer segments. The e⁄ect on total welfare is
equal to ￿W = ￿AS +￿CSF +￿CSA +￿￿ = 1
216rM￿(r ￿2)(4+r(16r ￿25)). The e⁄ect
on total welfare is ambiguous and depends on signf4 + r(16r ￿ 25)g.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The ￿rst-order condition is given by N(1 ￿
2pc
v ) = 0 which gives pc = v
2. The second-order
condition is satis￿ed since ￿N 2
v < 0. Substituting pc = v
2 in ￿F(pc) gives ￿F = N v
4.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Through the proof of proposition 1, ￿F ￿ ￿A+F > ￿A if s
￿ ￿ 1
2 since ￿ ￿ v. This gives
the ￿rst part of the proposition. If s
￿ 2]1
2;2[, then ￿A+F > ￿A by the proof of proposition
1 but it may be that ￿F ￿ ￿A+F. This is the case for v ￿ v￿ where v￿ is such that
￿F ￿ ￿A+F = N v￿
4 ￿ N
(￿+s)2
27￿s = 0. This gives the second part. If s
￿ ￿ 2, then ￿A > ￿A+F
by the proof of proposition 1 but it may be that ￿F ￿ ￿A. This is the case for v ￿ v￿￿
where v￿￿is such that ￿F ￿ ￿A = N v￿￿
4 ￿ N s
4 = 0.
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